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Abstract 
 
Although there is no doubt that social security can help poverty reduction, their effect on 
poverty reduction can vary for different situations. This paper uses fixed-effects 
regression to estimate the effects of social security transfers including contributory 
pensions and social allowances on consumption expenditure of receiving households, and 
subsequently investigates the impact of the social security transfers on poverty in 
Vietnam. It is found that both pensions and social allowances increase expenditure of 
households, especially expenditure on non-food consumption. Pensions have a higher 
effect on expenditure than social allowances. Pensions and social allowances reduce 
poverty of the recipients as well as the whole population.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a broad consensus that economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for poverty reduction. How strong a poverty-reducing effect economic growth 
has, depends on what happens to income distribution. Nowadays, many developing 
countries follow a pro-poor growth policy to promote both economic growth and poverty 
reduction. A strategy of pro-poor growth does not only focus on economic growth, but 
also affects the pattern of income distribution so that the poor can benefit from economic 
growth proportionally more than the rich, which will reduce the welfare gap between the 
poor and the rich, and finally eliminate poverty.1 One of important policies of income 
redistribution is to provide social security transfers for the poor, vulnerable, and other 
targeted groups. Social security transfers are often provided in cash, but sometimes in 
kind or in vouchers. Cash transfers are relatively easy to deliver and allow the recipients 
to use cash in their optimal way.2     
The important role of the social security transfers in improving household welfare 
can be found in a large number of studies. For example, empirical studies such as 
Barrientos and DeJong (2006), Maluccio (2005), Gertlert (2000), Behrman and 
Hoddinott (2000), Parker and Skoufias (2001), Skoufias and McClafferty (2001) show 
that programs providing conditional cash transfers help the recipients reduce child labor, 
increase child schooling, and improving nutrition and health. Positive effect of social 
security transfers on income and consumption are also found in Devereux (2002), 
Hoddinott (2000), Sadoulet et al. (2001), etc. Regarding impact on poverty, Morley and 
Cody (2003) find the Progresa program in Mexico helps the beneficiaries reduce the 
poverty gap by 36 percent.   
However, the social transfers are not always a panacea for poverty reduction. 
There are several reasons why a social transfer program has negligible impact on poverty 
reduction. Firstly, there can be high leakage rate of social transfer programs. Any 
                                                     
1
 For discussion of pro-poor growth, for example, see Bhagwati (1988), McKay (1996), World Bank 
(1996), Goudie and Ladd (1999), Kakwani and Ernesto (2000), Jörgen and Bigsten (2000), Perkins et al. 
(2001), etc.  
2
 The advantage of cash transfer are discussed in DFID (2005), Farrington and Slater (2006), Barrientos 
and DeJong (2006), Gelan (2006). 
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program would have leakage problems, i.e., the program covers not only eligible but also 
ineligible people. For example, in the Progresa program which are often mentioned as a 
successful targeting program, the 60 percent richest of population receive 20 percent of 
program benefits (Barrientos and DeJong, 2006). The problem is also popular in 
developed countries. The poorest tend to receive less from social security program than 
the middle and the richest (Friedman and Friedman, 1979; Howe and Longman, 1992; 
Castles ad Mitchell, 1993). Secondly, the receipt of social transfers can mitigate the 
incentive to work of the recipients. The recipients become too dependent on social 
assistance, and they can fall into poverty when not receiving assistance (Dreze, 2005; 
Sahn and Alderman; 1996). In an extreme situation, income of recipients of social 
transfer would have been lower than their income if they had not received the social 
transfers. In this case, the social transfers would have detrimental effects on the 
recipients’ income and poverty reduction. Thirdly, there are some arguments that income 
redistribution can harm economic growth, thereby poverty reduction in the long run. For 
example, the Harrod-Domar model argues that economic development depends heavily 
on capital stock, and greater inequality would lead to higher growth rates.3 Social 
transfers often require large funds from the State budget. As a result, the State can apply 
heavy or progressive taxation, which mitigate production and investment (Arrow, 1979; 
Lindbeck et al., 1994). 
Vietnam has committed itself to follow the “growth with equity” strategy as a 
principle to the development. Vietnam has achieved high economic growth with the 
annual GDP growth rate of around 6 percent during over the past 10 years. The poverty 
incidence has been reduced remarkably from 58 to 16 percent between 1993 and 2006. 
The government of Vietnam has maintained an extensive social security system. There 
are several studies aiming to measure the effect of social security on household welfare. 
Van de Wall (2002) examined the poverty targeting and impact of Vietnam’s public 
safety net on the poverty incidence using Vietnam Living Standard Surveys (VLSS) 1993 
and 1998. She found that social insurance and subsidies did not reach the poor well. The 
percentage of households receiving benefits was very similar in expenditure quintiles. 
For example, around 9.5 and 11.6 percent of the poorest (the lowest expenditure quintile) 
                                                     
3
 See Domar (1946) and Harrod (1939).  
 4
received social insurance and subsidies in 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, these figures 
for the richest (the highest expenditure quintile) were 13.9 and 7.3 percent. Social 
transfers helps to reduce the poverty incidence by around 2.8 percentage points. Evan et 
al. (2006) measure the impact of social transfers by comparing poverty rates with social 
transfers and poverty rates based on counterfactual expenditures which were calculated 
by subtracting social transfers from the actual expenditures. They find that all types of 
social security transfers reduce the poverty incidence by 4.6 percent. Van den Berg and 
Nguyen (2011) measure the effect of total public transfers on household income and 
poverty. They find a large positive effect on income and consumption but a little effect of 
public transfers on poverty reduction.  
The objective of the paper is to examine how well social security including 
pensions and social allowances reach the poor and to which extent these social security 
transfers affect household consumption and poverty in Vietnam. Unlike Van den Berg 
and Nguyen (2010) which consider the effect of all the public transfers, we estimate the 
effect of pensions and social allowances separately. In addition, we consider the effect of 
pensions and social allowances on expenditures and share of expenditures on different 
items including rice, non-rice food, health and education, durables and other non-foods. 
Data used in this paper are from two Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys 2004 
and 2006.  
The paper is structured into 5 sections. The second describes data source, social 
security system in Vietnam. The third section presents the method to measure the impact 
of social transfers. Next, the fourth section presents the empirical findings on transfer 
impact. Finally, the fifth section concludes.  
 
2. Pensions and social allowances in Vietnam 
 
The study relies on data from the two Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys 
(VHLSS), which were conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) with 
technical support from the World Bank (WB) in the years 2004 and 2006. The 2004 and 
2006 VHLSSs covered 9189 and 9188 households, respectively. The samples are 
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representative for the national, rural and urban, and regional levels. The 2004 and 2006 
VHLSSs set up a panel of 4216 households, which are representative for the whole 
country, and for the urban and rural population.  
The surveys contain household and commune data. Household data include basic 
demography, employment and labor force participation, education, health, income, 
expenditure, housing, fixed assets and durable goods, participation of households in 
poverty alleviation programs, and especially information on pensions and social 
allowances that households had received during the 12 months before the interview. Data 
on commune characteristics consist of demography and general situation of communes, 
general economic conditions and aid programs, non-farm employment, agriculture 
production, local infrastructure and transportation, education, health, and social affairs. 
However, the commune data are only available for rural areas.  
According to VHLSSs, the proportion of people with per capita expenditure under 
the poverty line dropped dramatically from 58 percent in 1993 to 37 percent in 1998. The 
poverty rate continued to decrease to 20 and 16 percent in 2004 and 2006, respectively. 
However, the poverty rate remains rather high in rural areas, at 20 percent in 2006. 4  
One of important policies on poverty reduction is the social security net. In 
Vietnam, the social security net includes a large number of programs which can be 
divided into two types. The first one can be called social insurance which is based on a 
contribution scheme. To receive benefits from the social insurance, beneficiaries have to 
contribute to the budget of the social insurance. The social insurance consists of 
mandatory health insurance and pensions. The health insurance has been operated by 
Vietnam Health Insurance since 1995 (Evans et al., 2006). The pensions have been 
implemented by Vietnam Social Insurance since 1962 (Giang, 2004). However, before 
1995 it covered only the State sector. After that the pensions have been expanded to 
covers the employees from the state-owned enterprises and private ones. Both health 
insurance and pensions are compulsory for employees in State organizations, State-
owned enterprises, and private enterprises with ten employees or more. Employers 
                                                     
4
 In this study, a household is classified as poor if their per capita expenditure is below the poverty line 
which is set up by WB and GSO. The poverty line is equivalent to the expenditure level that allows for 
nutritional needs and some essential non-food consumption such as clothing and housing. The poverty 
lines in the years 2004 and 2006 are equal to 2077 and 2560 thousands VND, respectively.  
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deduct a portion of employees’ monthly salary to pay contributions to the social 
insurance. Thus, this scheme is also called the pay-as-you-go basis. In this paper, we are 
interested in the evaluation of pensions. Pensions include several types of benefits, i.e., 
maternity benefits, sickness assistances, assistances for industrial injury and occupation 
diseases, payments for job loss and redundancy, monthly pensions, and death benefits. 
Most of pension benefits are paid in cash.5  
The second type of the social security in Vietnam is the assistances and supports 
from the government and other organizations and enterprises, both domestic and 
international, to reduce economic shocks and poverty. The most important policies of the 
social assistances are the National Targeted Programs (NTP) and the social allowances. 
The NTPs are conducted by the government with the objective to reduce poverty. The 
NTPs provide the poor with several support programs such as education, health, 
production, construction of infrastructure, etc. The social allowances are the supports to 
some groups with difficulties such as war invalids, people with merit to the country 
during the war, old people and children who do not have someone to take care, people 
losing working capacity, and households adversely affected by natural calamities. Most 
of the social allowances are in form of cash. In some cases, the supports can be in kind 
such as food, clothes, production inputs and materials for housing repairs, etc.6 In this 
paper, we investigate the poverty targeting and the impact of social allowances.7  
It should be noted that if pensions and social allowances are provided for 
households in kind, VHLSS will report their equivalent values. Of course, households 
cannot have absolutely accurate valuation of received goods. However, the value of in-
kind transfers account for a negligible proportion of the total transfers.        
If the poor receive larger pensions and social allowances, the effect of pensions and 
social allowances on poverty reduction will be higher. Table 1 presents the receiving of 
pensions by the poor and non-poor in 2004 and 2006. The coverage of pensions was 
almost unchanged during the period 2004-2006. There were around 10 percent of 
                                                     
5
 For more information on the pension scheme in Vietnam, see Government, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1998 and 
2003. 
6
 For more information on the social allowances in Vietnam, see Government, 1993b, 2003. 
7
 We do not evaluate programs under the NTPs. Since there are many programs, and the treatments of these 
program cannot be added (not in form of cash).    
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households receiving pensions. The proportion of pensions-receiving households for the 
poor was lower than that for the non-poor. In 2004 and 2006, the percentage of the poor 
receiving transfers was 3.4 and 2.6 percent, respectively. Meanwhile, these figures for 
the non-poor were 12.8 and 11.6 percent in 2004 and 2006, respectively. As a result, the 
non-poor accounted for a very large proportion of the pension-receiving households, at 
94.8 and 96.6 percent in 2004 and 2006, respectively.  
In addition, the non-poor received a higher mount of pensions than the poor, and 
the difference in the pensions between the poor and non-poor tended to be higher during 
the period 2004-2006. The percentage of pensions over household income for the poor 
was a bit higher than for the non-poor.   
Table 1: Pensions of the poor and non-poor 
Indicators 
 2004   2006  
Poor Non Poor All Poor Non Poor All 
% receiving households 
3.4 12.8 11.2 2.6 11.6 10.4 
[0.5] [0.5] [0.4] [0.5] [0.5] [0.4] 
Transfer amount* (thousand 
VND) 
3917.8 8478.0 8241.9 4921.3 11825.5 11591.9 
[353.9] [226.9] [219.5] [574.2] [336.0] [329.3] 
Distribution of receiving 
households  
5.2 94.8 100 3.4 96.6 100 
[0.7] [0.7]  [0.6] [0.6]  
Distribution of transfer 
amount 
2.5 97.5 100 1.4 98.6 100 
[0.4] [0.4]  [0.3] [0.3]  
% of transfers over 
household income 
34.9 29.5 29.6 36.7 35.7 35.7 
[2.6] [1.0] [1.0] [4.2] [1.3] [1.3] 
Note: * in the price of 2004. 
Figures in brackets are standard errors. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weight and cluster correlation.  
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
  
 The amount and distribution of social allowances across the poor and non-poor are 
presented in Table 2. In contrast to pensions, social allowances were more pro-poor. In 
2004 and 2006, there were 25.4 and 25.6 percent of the poor households receiving social 
allowances, respectively. The proportion of the non-poor receiving allowances is 10.3 
and 12.4 percent for 2004 and 2006, respectively.   
Table 2: Social allowances of the poor and non-poor 
Indicators 
 2004   2006  
Poor Non Poor All Poor Non Poor All 
% receiving households 
25.4 10.4 13.0 25.6 12.4 14.2 
[1.3] [0.4] [0.4] [1.4] [0.4] [0.4] 
Transfer amount* (thousand 
VND) 
589.1 1508.9 1202.1 1028.7 2673.7 2272.1 
[50.1] [66.1] [50.5] [110.9] [106.9] [89.1] 
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Indicators 
 2004   2006  
Poor Non Poor All Poor Non Poor All 
Distribution of receiving 
households  
33.4 66.6 100 24.4 75.6 100 
[1.5] [1.5]  [1.4] [1.4]  
Distribution of amount 
16.4 83.7 100 11.1 89.0 100 
[1.6] [1.6]  [1.3] [1.3]  
% of transfers over 
household income 
7.5 7.8 7.7 10.1 11.8 11.7 
[0.8] [0.5] [0.4] [1.4] [0.5] [0.5] 
Note: * in the price of 2004. 
Figures in brackets are standard errors. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weight and cluster correlation.  
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
 
However, the poor received smaller average social allowances than the non-poor. 
The average amount of social allowances received by the poor and non-poor households 
was 1029 and 2674 thousand VND in 2006, respectively. As a result, the non-poor 
accounted for 75.6 percent of allowance-receiving households, but 89 percent of the total 
amount of allowances in 2006.  
 Table 3 presents per capita expenditure and poverty of households with and 
households without pensions. It shows that pension-receiving households have higher 
expenditure and lower poverty than non-receiving households. As expected, expenditure 
share on foods, both rice and non-rice, is lower for the recipients than the non-recipients. 
The expenditure share on education and health, durables and other non-food items is for 
the pension recipients than the non-recipients.  
 Unlike the pension-receiving households, households receiving social allowances 
have lower expenditure and higher poverty than those not receiving allowances (Table 
4).  Households receiving social allowances have lower expenditure share on food but 
higher expenditure share on non-food items than households not receiving allowances.  
Table 3: Expenditure and poverty of households receiving and not receiving pensions 
 
2004 2006 
Household 
with  
pensions 
Household 
without 
pensions 
Household 
with  
pensions 
Household 
without 
pensions 
Per capita expenditure * 6451.0 4356.4 7873.6 4980.9 
 
[324.6] [124.0] [502.7] [132.7] 
Per capita expenditure on the 
following items     
Rice 467.5 450.9 483.5 493.9 
 
[9.5] [4.6] [10.3] [5.3] 
Non-rice food 1987.5 1399.3 2439.0 1697.0 
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2004 2006 
Household 
with  
pensions 
Household 
without 
pensions 
Household 
with  
pensions 
Household 
without 
pensions 
 
[95.7] [39.6] [116.6] [42.2] 
Durables 857.9 513.7 1229.9 514.5 
 
[66.6] [19.7] [317.6] [16.7] 
Health and education 728.8 544.0 779.7 543.6 
 
[43.3] [25.3] [57.9] [19.3] 
Other non-food items 2409.2 1448.6 2941.5 1731.8 
 
[170.5] [57.3] [214.4] [71.7] 
Share of expenditure on the 
following items     
Rice 0.1078 0.1531 0.0901 0.1436 
 
[0.0048] [0.0034] [0.0042] [0.0031] 
Non-rice food 0.3273 0.3407 0.3413 0.3607 
 
[0.0055] [0.0028] [0.0065] [0.0026] 
Durables 0.1195 0.0995 0.1181 0.0925 
 
[0.0038] [0.0017] [0.0049] [0.0014] 
Health and education 0.1176 0.1102 0.1101 0.1014 
 
[0.0054] [0.0021] [0.0074] [0.0019] 
Other non-food items 0.3277 0.2965 0.3404 0.3018 
 
[0.0067] [0.0031] [0.0085] [0.0034] 
Poverty indexes 
    
Poverty rate (P0) 0.0571 0.1896 0.0316 0.1434 
 
[0.0114] [0.0098] [0.0096] [0.0089] 
Poverty gap index (P1) 0.0132 0.0457 0.0074 0.0336 
 
[0.0033] [0.0030] [0.0026] [0.0026] 
Squared poverty gap index (P2) 0.0047 0.0165 0.0025 0.0118 
 
[0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0010] [0.0011] 
Note: All expenditure figures are in thousand VND * in the price of 2004. Expenditure figures are per 
capita, that is ‘Household expenditure divided by household size’. 
Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
 
Although the poor also received pensions and social allowances, the non-poor 
received much higher amount of pensions and social allowances. However this targeting 
analysis does not take into account that consumption that is used to define the poor and 
non-poor can be affected already by pensions and social allowances. Some non-poor can 
be poor without pensions and social allowances. It is expected that transfers can help 
poverty reduction. The issues of impact evaluation of pensions and social allowances on 
household welfare and poverty will be discussed in the following sections.8  
 
                                                     
8
 Table A.1 and A.2 in Appendix presents means and standard deviations of characteristic variables of 
households with and without transfers.  
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Table 4: Expenditure and poverty of households receiving and not receiving allowances 
 
2004 2006 
Household 
with 
allowances 
Household 
without 
allowances 
Household 
with 
allowances 
Household 
without 
allowances 
Per capita expenditure * 3326.2 4795.2 4355.5 5423.9 
 
[126.0] [143.1 [182.6] [160.9] 
Per capita expenditure on the 
following items     
Rice 447.8 453.5 493.3 492.8 
 
[6.3] [4.9] [7.6] [5.5] 
Non-rice food 1109.0 1522.7 1506.5 1816.1 
 
[38.7] [44.9] [58.0] [47.5] 
Durables 323.4 589.4 391.8 618.3 
 
[26.4] [23.4] [20.5] [43.4] 
Health and education 394.6 592.6 508.9 576.8 
 
[28.3] [26.7] [43.5] [20.2] 
Other non-food items 1051.5 1637.0 1455.1 1919.9 
 
[63.5] [67.8] [98.2] [82.8] 
Share of expenditure on the 
following items     
Rice 0.1963 0.1400 0.1657 0.1335 
 
[0.0065] [0.0033] [0.0053] [0.0031] 
Non-rice food 0.3528 0.3370 0.3652 0.3577 
 
[0.0053] [0.0027] [0.0055] [0.0027] 
Durables 0.0770 0.1058 0.0820 0.0973 
 
[0.0031] [0.0017] [0.0026] [0.0015] 
Health and education 0.1041 0.1121 0.1014 0.1024 
 
[0.0046] [0.0021] [0.0047] [0.0020] 
Other non-food items 0.2698 0.3050 0.2857 0.3091 
 
[0.0053] [0.0032] [0.0060] [0.0036] 
Poverty indexes 
    
Poverty rate (P0) 0.3472 0.1461 0.2424 0.1126 
 
[0.0247] [0.0085] [0.0212] [0.0080] 
Poverty gap index (P1) 0.1118 0.0304 0.0655 0.0248 
 
[0.0104] [0.0021] [0.0077] [0.0023] 
Squared poverty gap index (P2) 0.0483 0.0096 0.0257 0.0082 
 
[0.0055] [0.0009] [0.0041] [0.0009] 
Note: All expenditure figures are in thousand VND * in the price of 2004. Expenditure figures are per 
capita, that is ‘Household expenditure divided by household size’. 
Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
 
3. Impact evaluation method 
 
The impact on household expenditure 
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To assess the impact of the receiving of pensions and allowances, we assume income or 
consumption can be specified as follows: 
                                
( ) itiitittit uDXTYln +++++= νββββ 3210 ,              (1)  
where ( )itYln  is logarithm of expenditures per capita of household i at time t. Tt is a year 
dummy, with a one for 2006; This dummy variable enables to control for common 
macroeconomic changes between the two years. X is a vector of household and 
community level control variables. D is a vector of two dummy variables indicating 
whether a household obtain pensions and social allowances. iν and itu  are unobserved 
variables which are time-invariant and time-variant, respectively. 9  
In addition to the impact on household welfare indicators, we also the impact of 
remittances on the consumption pattern of households. Following Adams (2005) and 
Adams and Cuecuecha (2010), we start with the Engel function: 
       
( )iijijjij Ylog)Y(YC ηδα ++=                 (2) 
where Cij is the expenditure on item j of household i. iY  is the total expenditure, and 
∑=
j
iji CY . Then the share of expenditure on item j in the total expenditure is expressed 
as follows:  
               
( )ijj
i
j
i
ij Ylog
YY
C ηδα ++=               (3) 
 To examine whether receipts of pensions and allowances can change the 
expenditure share, we add these variables, other control variables, the time variables to 
equation (3) as follows: 
 
( ) ijtijjitjitjtitjj
it
j
it
ijt DXTYlog
YEXP
C
εpiγβαηδα +++++++=   (4) 
                                                     
9
 We do not use the transfer size as the intervention variable, since the transfer size is continuous variable, 
and the semi-log function of consumption will impose an unrealistic assumption on the increasing marginal 
impact of transfers on consumption. We do not use the logarithm of transfers in the right-hand side, since 
there are many households without transfers, and taking logarithm of zero returns missing values. In 
addition, using the dummy variable of transfer receipt can reduce measurement error of transfer data. 
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The marginal effect of the receipts of pensions and allowances on the share of 
expenditure on item j is measured by parameter jγ . 
The main problem in estimating the equation is the endogeneity of transfer receipt. 
Receipt of pensions as well as social allowances can be correlated with unobserved 
characteristics of households. In this study, we use fixed-effect regressions to reduce 
endogeneity bias. Fixed-effects regressions assume that unobserved variables which are 
correlated with the receipt of pensions as well as social allowances are time-invariants. 
By transformation of data, fixed-effects model remove these time-invariant unobserved 
variables ( iν  in equation (1) and ijpi in equation (4)).   
 
The impact on expenditure poverty 
 
In this paper, poverty is measured by three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indexes 
which can all be calculated using the following formula (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 
1984). Since poverty indexes are not a continuous function of expenditure, we cannot 
estimate the effect of pensions and allowances on poverty indexes by deriving the 
derivative of poverty index with respect to the variable of pensions and allowances. 
However, we can measure the impact of pensions and social allowance receipt on a 
poverty index Pt of the recipients at the time t using as the follow formula: 
    )D|Y(P)D|Y(PP tt)D(t 11 011 =−===∆ ,            (5) 
where 1Y  and 0Y  denote the expenditure of the transfer-receiving households in the 
presence and absence of the transfers, respectively. Suppose we measure the effect of 
pension receipt, and D denotes the receipt of pensions. The effect of allowance receipt is 
estimated using the same estimation strategy. The first term in the right-hand side of (5) 
is the poverty measure of the receiving households with pensions, and this term is 
observed and estimated directly from the data. The second term in the right-hand side of 
(5) is the counterfactual measure of poverty, i.e., the poverty index of the receiving 
households if they had not received pensions. This term is not observed directly, and it is 
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estimated using the estimated parameters in equation (1). Using equation (1), the 
observed expenditure of household i at time t can be expressed as follows: 
                                 )uˆˆˆDˆXˆTˆexp(Y itiitittit +++++= νββββ 3210 ,   (6) 
where the ‘hat’ parameters denote the estimators of the corresponding parameters, and 
‘exp’ denotes the exponential function. Expenditure of a household, who received 
pensions (or allowances), in the absence of the pensions (or allowances) is estimated by 
substituting zero for the D variable:  
                                     )uˆˆˆXˆTˆexp(Yˆ itiittit ++++= νβββ 210     (7) 
Adding and subtracting 3βˆDit  in equation (7) and after simple algebra, we can get: 
                           
[ ]
[ ]
).ˆexp(Y
)ˆDexp(Y
ˆD)Yln(exp
ˆDˆD)uˆˆˆXˆTˆ(expYˆ
it
itit
itit
itititiittit
3
3
3
33210
     
     
     
  
β
β
β
ββνβββ
−=
−=
−=
−+++++=
        (8) 
The last line of equation (8) comes from the fact that households receiving pensions have 
observed value of the D variable equal to 1. We can use  itYˆ to estimate )D|Y(Pt 10 =  - 
the poverty index of the receiving households in the absence of pensions. 
 It is possible to estimate the impact of the receipt of pensions or social allowances 
on the total poverty as follows: 
       )Y(P)Y(PP ttt 0−=∆ ,     (9) 
where P(Y) is the observed poverty index of all population (in which the recipients 
received pensions or allowances), and  )Y(P 0  is the poverty index of all population if the 
recipients had not received the pensions or social allowances. It should be noted that (9) 
is different from the effect on poverty if all the households receive pensions (or 
allowances): 
                                                )Y(P)Y(PP ttALLt 01 −=∆ ,     (10) 
 14
where )Y(Pt 1  is the poverty indexes if all the households receive pensions or allowances. 
In this study, we do not estimate (10) since it is unrealistic that pensions as well as 
allowances are provided for all the households at a point of time.  
We estimate the standard error of the estimates of the impact on poverty indexes by 
using a non-parametric bootstrap technique.10    
   
4. Results of impact estimation 
 
In this section, we present empirical findings on the impact pensions and social 
allowances on expenditure pattern and poverty using the fixed-effect regression. 
Dependent variables include per capita expenditure and expenditure share on food and 
non-food items. The explanatory variables in regressions include demography, household 
land, education, and availability of car road to villages. The list of the explanatory 
variables is presented in Table A.1 and A.2. It should be noted that the explanatory 
variables should not be affected by the transfers (Heckman et al. 1997). Time-invariants 
variables are removed by fixed-effects regressions. Thus variables such as urbanity or 
regional dummies are not included. The full regression results are reported in Tables A.3 
and A.4 of Appendix. Tables 5 and 6 present only the estimated coefficient of the 
pension and allowance receipt.   
 Table 5 shows that receiving pensions and allowances increases per capita 
expenditure by around 6 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively. The average expenditure 
of households receiving pensions and social allowances is 7873.6 and 4355.5 thousand 
VND, respectively. Thus the effect of the receipt of pensions and allowances on 
expenditure of the receiving household is around 472 and 148 thousand VND, 
respectively.  
                                                     
10
 This bootstrap is implemented by repeatedly drawing samples from the original sample of the VHLSS 
panel data. Since the VHLSSs sample selection follows stratified random cluster sampling, communes 
instead of households are bootstrapped in each stratum (Deaton, 1997). The bootstrap is made of 
communes (i.e., clusters) within provinces. The number of replications is 500. 
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The receipt of pensions mainly increases non-food consumption including health 
care and education, and other non-food consumption excluding durables. It should be 
noted that we combine expenditure on health and expenditure on education so that the 
variable of spending on health and expenditure is larger than 0 for all households and we 
can get log of this variable. The receipt of allowances reduces the rice consumption but 
increases the non-rice food consumption. It also increases non-food consumption 
including health care and education, and other non-food consumption excluding durables. 
Table 5: Impacts of the receipt of pensions and allowances on per capita expenditure 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variables 
Logarithm of 
per capita 
expenditure 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
on rice 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
on non-rice 
food 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
on durables 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
on health 
and 
education 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
on other 
non-food 
items 
Receiving of pensions 
(yes=1) 
0.0598** -0.0223 0.0419 -0.0486 0.0775* 0.2332* 
[0.0294] [0.0308] [0.0403] [0.0631] [0.0443] [0.1295] 
Receiving of 
allowances (yes=1) 
0.0339** -0.0320* 0.0666*** -0.0349 0.0208* 0.1401** 
[0.0154] [0.0174] [0.0238] [0.0430] [0.0122] [0.0662] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8432 8438 8438 8438 8438 8438 
R-squared 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.12 0.01 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from panel data VHLSSs 2004-2006. 
 
Table 6 shows the effect of pensions and allowances on expenditure shares. 
Receiving pensions does not have a statistically significant effect on expenditure shares. 
However, receiving allowances change the expenditure pattern of households. More 
specifically, it reduces the share of expenditure on rice and durables, but increases the 
expenditure share on non-rice food consumption.   
Table 6: Impacts of the receipt of pensions and allowances on share of expenditure on 
different items 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variables 
Share of 
expenditure on 
rice 
Share of 
expenditure on 
non-rice food 
Share of 
expenditure on 
durables 
Share of 
expenditure on 
health and 
education 
Share of 
expenditure on 
other non-food 
items 
Receiving of pensions 
(yes=1) 
-0.0027 -0.0019 -0.0083 0.0029 0.0100 
[0.0047] [0.0090] [0.0053] [0.0095] [0.0105] 
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Explanatory variables 
Dependent variables 
Share of 
expenditure on 
rice 
Share of 
expenditure on 
non-rice food 
Share of 
expenditure on 
durables 
Share of 
expenditure on 
health and 
education 
Share of 
expenditure on 
other non-food 
items 
Receiving of allowances 
(yes=1) 
-0.0058** 0.0146** -0.0038* -0.0039 0.0004 
[0.0026] [0.0059] [0.0027] [0.0056] [0.0054] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8438 8438 8438 8438 8438 
R-squared 0.39 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.10 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from panel data VHLSSs 2004-2006. 
 
Table 7 presents the estimates of pensions’ impact on poverty of the population. It 
shows that pensions contribute to poverty reduction of the recipients. All the estimates 
are statistically significant. Pensions reduce the poverty incidence (P0) for the recipients 
by around 2.7 and 1.1 percentage points for 2004 and 2006. They also decreases the 
poverty gap index (P1) and poverty severity index. In 2006, pensions helped the 
recipients decrease the poverty gap index (P1) by around 17 percent and poverty severity 
index (P2) by around 20 percent. The effect of pensions on the total poverty was very 
small, since pensions covered only around 3 percent of the poor households. 
Table 7: The impact of pensions on poverty  
 
 2004   2006  
With  
pensions 
Without 
pensions 
Impact With  
pensions 
Without 
pensions 
Impact 
Poverty of recipients  
     
P0 0.0628*** 0.0893*** -0.0265** 0.0439*** 0.0550*** -0.0110** 
 [0.0085] [0.0161] [0.0133] [0.0078] [0.0102] [0.0056] 
P1 0.0131*** 0.0167*** -0.0036* 0.0114*** 0.0138*** -0.0024* 
 [0.0023] [0.0034] [0.0019] [0.0023] [0.0029] [0.0013] 
P2 0.0042*** 0.0054*** -0.0012* 0.0040*** 0.0049*** -0.0010* 
 [0.0010] [0.0014] [0.0007] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0006] 
All poverty 
      
P0 0.1949*** 0.1977*** -0.0028** 0.1597*** 0.1608*** -0.0011* 
 [0.0057] [0.0059] [0.0014] [0.0059] [0.0060] [0.0006] 
P1 0.0472*** 0.0476*** -0.0004** 0.0383*** 0.0385*** -0.0002* 
 [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0002] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0001] 
P2 0.0170*** 0.0171*** -0.0001* 0.0137*** 0.0138*** -0.0001* 
 [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0001] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0001] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 500 
replications. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
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The impact estimation of social allowances is presented in Table 8. Estimates of 
impact on the poverty incidence are statistically significant at the 10% level. The receipt 
of social allowances reduced the poverty incidence of the recipients by around 2.3 and 
1.7 percentage points in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Social allowances also helped the 
recipients decreased their poverty gap and poverty severity.  
Table 8: Impact of social allowances on poverty 
 
 2004   2006  
With transfers Without 
transfers 
Impact With transfers Without 
transfers 
Impact 
Poverty of recipients  
     
P0 0.3850*** 0.4083*** -0.0233* 0.3037*** 0.3202*** -0.0166* 
 [0.0178] [0.0250] [0.0151] [0.0180] [0.0218] [0.0098] 
P1 0.1169*** 0.1241*** -0.0072* 0.0865*** 0.0924*** -0.0059* 
 [0.0073] [0.0096] [0.0043] [0.0080] [0.0093] [0.0035] 
P2 0.0488*** 0.0525*** -0.0037* 0.0352*** 0.0380*** -0.0028* 
 [0.0040] [0.0051] [0.0021] [0.0046] [0.0052] [0.0016] 
All poverty 
      
P0 0.1949*** 0.1981*** -0.0032* 0.1597*** 0.1623*** -0.0026* 
 [0.0057] [0.0060] [0.0019] [0.0059] [0.0062] [0.0015] 
P1 0.0472*** 0.0482*** -0.0010* 0.0383*** 0.0392*** -0.0009* 
 [0.0019] [0.0020] [0.0006] [0.0019] [0.0021] [0.0006] 
P2 0.0170*** 0.0175*** -0.0005* 0.0137*** 0.0141*** -0.0004* 
 [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0003] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0002] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
 
Social allowances also contribute to reduction of the total poverty. It is interesting 
that the impacts of social allowances on total poverty reduction are higher than the 
impacts of pensions. This is because social allowances cover a larger proportion of the 
poor than pensions.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Social security transfers are often mentioned as important external sources of income for 
the poor and vulnerable household to cope with socioeconomic shocks and to get rid of 
poverty. Using data from the household surveys, we investigate how well contributory 
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pensions and social assistance allowances reach the poor and to which extent these 
transfers affect household expenditure and poverty. 
It is found that the non-poor households tended to receive larger pensions than the 
poor households. This is because pensions are based on the contributory scheme. Only 
people who worked in formal sectors can have pensions, and the non-poor are more 
likely to have formal jobs than the poor. Only 2.6 percent of the poor households 
received pensions in 2006, while this figure for the non-poor was 11.6 percent. In 
contrast, social allowances reached the poor better than pensions. The proportion of 
households receiving social allowances was 25.6 and 12.4 percent for the poor and non-
poor households, respectively. Regarding the average amount of transfers, the non-poor 
received higher amount of transfers, both pensions and allowances, than the poor.  
 To measure impact of pensions and social allowances, we apply the fixed-effect 
regression using panel data. It is showed that the receipt of pensions and allowances 
increases per capita expenditure by around 6 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively. The 
effect of pensions was much larger than that of social allowances, since the average 
amount of pensions was substantially larger than the average amount of social 
allowances. Interestingly, pensions and allowances mainly increase expenditure on health 
care, education and non-food consumption excluding durables. Social allowances also 
have a positive effect on non-rice consumption but a negative effect on rice consumption. 
Compared with social allowances, recipients of pensions were more successful in 
getting rid of poverty. Pensions reduced the poverty incidence (P0) for the recipients by 
around 2.7 and 1.1 percentage points in 2004 and 2006, respectively. They also 
decreased both the poverty gap index (P1) and poverty severity index (P2) of the 
recipients by around 17 and 20 percent in 2006.  
Meanwhile, impact estimates of social allowances on the poverty incidence are also 
negative and statistically significant. The receipt of social allowances reduced the 
poverty incidence of the recipients by around 2.3 and 1.7 percentage points in 2004 and 
2006, respectively. Social allowances also helped the recipients decreased their poverty 
gap and poverty severity.  
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Pensions as well as social allowances also contribute to reduction of the total 
poverty. It is interesting that the impacts of social allowances on total poverty reduction 
are higher than the impacts of pensions. This is because social allowances cover a larger 
proportion of the poor than pensions. Since the coverage of pensions and social 
allowances is rather small, their impacts on total poverty are very small.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of households with and without pensions 
 
Variables Type 2004 2006 
Household 
with 
pensions 
Household 
without 
pensions 
Household 
with 
pensions 
Household 
without 
pensions 
Household variables      
Ratio of members younger than 16 to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.1032 0.2534 0.0966 0.2209 
 [0.0071] [0.0045] [0.0075] [0.0041] 
Ratio of members older than 60 to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.2581 0.1077 0.2770 0.1188 
 [0.0156] [0.0043] [0.0177] [0.0044] 
Ratio of female members to total household 
members 
Continuous 0.5071 0.5135 0.5138 0.5176 
 [0.0084] [0.0036] [0.0092] [0.0034] 
Household size Discrete 4.0446 4.3894 3.9100 4.2781 
  [0.0900] [0.0372] [0.0992] [0.0371] 
Ratio of members with technical degree to 
total household members 
Continuous 0.1894 0.0512 0.2235 0.0544 
 [0.0142] [0.0030] [0.0148] [0.0029] 
Ratio of members with post secondary to 
total household members 
Continuous 0.1027 0.0231 0.1303 0.0253 
 [0.0129] [0.0028] [0.0155] [0.0027] 
Area of annual crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 0.4175 0.7222 0.3125 0.7977 
  [0.0450] [0.0346] [0.0380] [0.0443] 
Area of perennial crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 0.1212 0.2204 0.1457 0.2529 
  [0.0406] [0.0259] [0.0370] [0.0275] 
Commune variables      
Car road to village (yes = 1) Binary 0.5260 0.6225 0.4954 0.6694 
  [0.0369] [0.0184] [0.0372] [0.0179] 
Observations  438 3778 432 3784 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004-2006. 
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of households with and without allowances 
 
Variables Type 2004 2006 
Household 
with 
allowances 
Household 
without 
allowances 
Household 
with 
allowances 
Household 
without 
allowances 
Household variables      
Ratio of members younger than 16 to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.2648 0.2326 0.2276 0.2042 
 [0.0104] [0.0045] [0.0103] [0.0041] 
Ratio of members older than 60 to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.1600 0.1177 0.1836 0.1271 
 [0.0118] [0.0047] [0.0128] [0.0047] 
Ratio of female members to total household 
members 
Continuous 0.5301 0.5098 0.5328 0.5145 
 [0.0085] [0.0036] [0.0086] [0.0036] 
Household size Discrete 4.7369 4.2871 4.6281 4.1709 
  [0.1026] [0.0360] [0.1044] [0.0366] 
Ratio of members with technical degree to 
total household members 
Continuous 0.0449 0.0696 0.0569 0.0751 
 [0.0051] [0.0041] [0.0054] [0.0040] 
Ratio of members with post secondary to 
total household members 
Continuous 0.0246 0.0329 0.0230 0.0388 
 [0.0047] [0.0035] [0.0034] [0.0040] 
Area of annual crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 0.9265 0.6492 0.9985 0.7021 
  [0.0741] [0.0333] [0.0839] [0.0409] 
Area of perennial crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 0.2325 0.2059 0.2441 0.2411 
  [0.0617] [0.0239] [0.0405] [0.0270] 
Commune variables      
Road to village (yes = 1) Binary 0.6918 0.5986 0.7203 0.6387 
  [0.0252] [0.0198] [0.0237] [0.0193] 
Observations  690 3526 701 3515 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004-2006. 
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Table A.3: Fixed-effects regressions of logarithm of per capita consumption expenditures 
and logarithm of per capita expenditure on different items 
Explanatory variables 
Logarithm 
of per 
capita 
expenditure 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
on rice 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
on non-rice 
food 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
on durables 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
on health 
and 
education 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
on other 
non-food 
items 
Receiving of pensions 
(yes=1) 
0.0598** -0.0223 0.0419 -0.0486 0.0775* 0.2332* 
[0.0294] [0.0308] [0.0403] [0.0631] [0.0443] [0.1295] 
Receiving of allowances 
(yes=1) 
0.0339** -0.0320* 0.0666*** -0.0349 0.0208* 0.1401** 
[0.0154] [0.0174] [0.0238] [0.0430] [0.0122] [0.0662] 
Time effect (2006 variable) 0.1220*** 0.0709*** 0.1879*** 0.1233*** 0.1378*** 0.0168 
 [0.0068] [0.0078] [0.0083] [0.0157] [0.0102] [0.0259] 
Proportion of household 
members younger than 16  
-0.1048 -0.0219 -0.1294* -0.2003 -0.2635*** -0.2674 
[0.0671] [0.0549] [0.0684] [0.1298] [0.0837] [0.1755] 
Proportion of household 
members older than 60  
-0.2242*** 0.1984 -0.1354* -0.1346 -0.4177*** 0.2139 
[0.0551] [0.2134] [0.0768] [0.1725] [0.1063] [0.2973] 
Proportion of female 
members   
-0.1945*** 0.0265 -0.0182 -0.2282* -0.2716** -0.4229 
[0.0659] [0.0965] [0.0824] [0.1354] [0.1149] [0.2687] 
Household size -0.1589*** -0.0663** -0.1833*** -0.1725*** -0.1806*** 0.1896** 
 [0.0253] [0.0269] [0.0294] [0.0460] [0.0394] [0.0748] 
Household size squared 0.0068*** 0.0026 0.0086*** 0.0044 0.0066* -0.0126** 
 [0.0024] [0.0021] [0.0028] [0.0038] [0.0036] [0.0062] 
Proportion of hh. members 
with technical degree  
0.1206** 0.0167 0.1215** 0.2509*** 0.2268*** -0.4278** 
[0.0526] [0.0544] [0.0605] [0.0955] [0.0725] [0.2008] 
Proportion of hh. members 
with post secondary  
0.1338 0.1274 0.1344 0.1960 0.3324** -1.4694*** 
[0.0929] [0.1382] [0.1040] [0.1591] [0.1381] [0.3921] 
Area of annual crop land per 
capita (1000 m2) 
0.2969** -0.011 0.0052 0.0421 0.0035 0.0496 
[0.1490] [0.0180] [0.0200] [0.0478] [0.0280] [0.0655] 
Area of perennial crop land 
per capita (1000 m2) 
0.0259*** 0.0153*** 0.0280*** 0.0255** 0.0274*** 0.0541*** 
[0.0048] [0.0057] [0.0094] [0.0121] [0.0071] [0.0196] 
Road to village (yes = 1) 0.0085*** 0.0023 0.0162* 0.0141 0.0320*** 0.0025 
 [0.0019] [0.0057] [0.0088] [0.0113] [0.0087] [0.0192] 
Constant 8.5065*** 6.2435*** 7.6859*** 6.3150*** 7.7714*** 5.1914*** 
 [0.1679] [0.1082] [0.0909] [0.1494] [0.1172] [0.2660] 
Observations 8432 8438 8438 8438 8438 8438 
R-squared 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.12 0.01 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from panel data VHLSSs 2004-2006. 
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Table A.4: Fixed-effects regressions of share of expenditures on different items 
Explanatory variables 
Share of 
expenditure on 
rice 
Share of 
expenditure on 
non-rice food 
Share of 
expenditure on 
durables 
Share of 
expenditure on 
health and 
education 
Share of 
expenditure on 
other non-food 
items 
Receiving of pensions 
(yes=1) 
-0.0027 -0.0019 -0.0083 0.0029 0.0100 
[0.0047] [0.0090] [0.0053] [0.0095] [0.0105] 
Receiving of allowances 
(yes=1) 
-0.0058** 0.0146** -0.0038* -0.0039 0.0004 
[0.0026] [0.0059] [0.0027] [0.0056] [0.0054] 
1/per capita expenditure  210.61*** -249.31*** -95.79*** 78.80*** 55.68** 
 [22.77] [29.64] [22.78] [30.35] [28.07] 
Log of per capita 
expenditure 
-0.0416*** -0.1172*** -0.0442*** 0.1059*** 0.0971*** 
[0.0057] [0.0100] [0.0095] [0.0131] [0.0126] 
Time effect (2006 variable) 0.0057*** 0.0239*** -0.0054*** -0.0056** -0.0187*** 
 [0.0010] [0.0022] [0.0012] [0.0022] [0.0023] 
Proportion of household 
members younger than 16  
0.0101 0.0238 0.0048 0.001 -0.0397*** 
[0.0068] [0.0160] [0.0095] [0.0162] [0.0153] 
Proportion of household 
members older than 60  
-0.0058 0.0114 -0.0201* -0.0587*** 0.0732*** 
[0.0091] [0.0204] [0.0110] [0.0198] [0.0205] 
Proportion of female 
members   
0.0013 0.0321 -0.0015 -0.0125 -0.0193 
[0.0088] [0.0206] [0.0101] [0.0203] [0.0177] 
Household size -0.0112*** -0.0225*** -0.0109*** 0.0046 0.0400*** 
 [0.0028] [0.0061] [0.0034] [0.0061] [0.0051] 
Household size squared 0.0007*** 0.0015*** 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0021*** 
 [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0004] 
Proportion of hh. members 
with technical degree  
0.0065 0.0176 0.0058 0.0248* -0.0547*** 
[0.0048] [0.0124] [0.0086] [0.0146] [0.0148] 
Proportion of hh. members 
with post secondary  
0.0105 0.0121 0.0188 0.0414 -0.0829*** 
[0.0068] [0.0229] [0.0187] [0.0263] [0.0251] 
Area of annual crop land per 
capita (1000 m2) 
-0.0011 -0.0013 0.0041 -0.0003 -0.0014 
[0.0027] [0.0047] [0.0028] [0.0048] [0.0052] 
Area of perennial crop land 
per capita (1000 m2) 
0.0008 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0004 
[0.0006] [0.0020] [0.0009] [0.0014] [0.0020] 
Road to village (yes = 1) -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0024* -0.002 
 [0.0005] [0.0018] [0.0009] [0.0014] [0.0017] 
Constant 0.4528*** 1.4209*** 0.5334*** -0.5918*** -0.8152*** 
 [0.0556] [0.0950] [0.0879] [0.1212] [0.1161] 
Observations 8438 8438 8438 8438 8438 
R-squared 0.39 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.1 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from panel data VHLSSs 2004-2006. 
 
